After sending the French army to the Central African Republic, French President Francois Hollande claimed, “France is not here in the Central African Republic out of a self interest.” Considering a legacy of 50 military interventions in 50 years following colonization, France has been an active force of intervention in Africa. These 50 years also mark a time in which France has protected self-interest in West Africa, not “human dignity”.

The recent intensification of interventionism and political presence in West Africa is linked to interests, as the correlation of loosing monopoly profits in the markets of former colonies, and the increase in interventions is staggeringly high.

Historically, France’s foreign policy in West Africa must be regarded around the concept of Françafrique, which was first mentioned by Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny to justify the maintenance of a close relationship with Paris even after independence. West African countries did not want to follow the fate of Guinea, whose president Seko Toure wanted to cut ties with the French under the slogan “We prefer freedom in poverty to opulence in slavery“. Thus a middle way had to be conceptualized, a post-colonial dilemma embodied in the love triangle of the neo-colonial elite, French Business, and the French Foreign Ministry, at the expense of West Africa’s population.

The ideology of Françafrique is bound by the dynamics of economic interests, political wisdom, and vague inconsistent humanitarian standards. Yet, Why is this ideology still so prevalent today amid so many past mistakes to learn from?

Institutions are sticky, thus practices and ideologies of institutions might be in friction with the reality of the time, especially in the context of France, whose administrative institutions cannot be understood without its relationship with its former colonies. Michael Galy, professor at Sciences Po reaffirms this notion in a recent article for Le Monde. He argues that the administration suffers from a “complexe militaro-colonial“ (Military-Colonial-Complex), which reinforces paternal and interventionist policies, and underlines the psychological repercussions of colonialism institutionally.

Another determinant of modern Françafrique, is France’s vast interest in the region. For instance, France’s interests in the Sahel Region (Mali, Niger) can be explained by France’s dependence on uranium. Eighty percent of France’s electricity supply stem from its 59 reactors, while Niger is the world’s third largest supplier of uranium. Former president Chirac spelled out the stakes in 2008 when he said, “Without Africa, France will slide down into the rank of a third [world] power”. For whom this might seem exaggerated needs to consider that France after a legacy of being an electricity importer, now is the largest electricity exporter in the world. Seems like the urgency is unfounded, or as Mitterand expressed it as early as 1957,

Without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century.

This dynamic also applies to CAR. France firstly intervened in the CAR when it reinstated the country’s first president David Dacko who was overthrown by a military coup and out of power from 1966-78 due to the notorious “Emperor of Central Africa”, Jean Bokassa. France endorsed Bokassa since he ‘rewarded his ‘patrons’ in Paris with the country’s natural resources, until they decided that the violent repression of a student rebellion created too much of a conflict of interest. The most recent strongman that France upheld was Francois Bozize, until his actions threatened French interests. Bozize’s fall seems to be strongly related to his government’s deals with the Chinese (oil), and South Africa (uranium). France’s support thus shifted to Michel Djotodia, who would briefly become CAR’s new president following a coup, and who was delighted to review all old contracts.

The question of human dignity has been used by Françafrique to hide the interests behind its selective activism. However France’s interest in the country and not its care for human rights have remained the constant in the countries’ bilateral relations. France has never truly stopped running the country economically. Air France, Bollore (logistic and river transport), Castel (drinks), Total (petroleum), and CFAO for the automobile distribution, dominate the Central African economy. Yet, across former colonies the monopoly profits in sectors such as logistics, infrastructure, and mining are threatened, since emerging economies such as South Africa, Turkey, Ethiopia, and China openly challenge France’s competitiveness. Recently, Turkish Airlines challenged Air France’s price-setting ability in Cameroon, and China Union is revamping the West-African mining market in countries such as Ivory Coast and Guinea.

Considering this dynamic, it seems like the right-wing Union (UMP) member Christian Jacobs is more honest than Hollande, as he told a radio interviewer: “The CAR military operation is essential, given the country’s strategic location in the heart of Africa”. The current French campaign including about 1,500 fighters is trying to assist new President Catherine Samba-Panza, the third female African head of state, consolidate power. This campaign is to be understood as necessary due to several shortcomings of French foreign policy, the politicization and segregation of religious groups, and the failure of the African Union to mobilize capacity earlier.

Despite earlier failures, the African Union now has 6,000 soldiers on the ground, compared to the 1,500 French soldiers, which have received more global media coverage than their African counterparts, of course. Violence in CAR has killed about 1,500 people in the last month, while displacing one-fifth of the country’s 4.6 million inhabitants.

Many images of the fighting between Anti-balaka (Christian), and Seleka (Muslim), such as those captured by Emergency Director of the Human Rights Watch, Peter Bouckaert, are reminiscent of the sights of ’94 in Rwanda. The French were said to favour the francophone Hutus during the Rwandan genocide, marking one of the darkest hours of Françafrique. Although French influence in the fighting is not to be compared in intensity or credibility to the Rwandan genocide, there are claims that France is favouring the Anti-Balaka, over the Seleka, which now with fading Chadian support face extreme danger. In a latest blow to France’s role in the region, experts in the CAR credited the Rwandan army to be most effective in the disarmament and depolarization of the conflict.

Former French President Sarkozy surprised many when he made a speech in Cotonou, Benin (2006), calling for new partnership and the end of Françafrique. Unfortunately France’s current actions are as deceitful as Sarkozy himself. In Sarkozy’s much discussed Dakar speech, he claims to regret that the “African is yet to truly enter history”.

This paternalistic view, which frequently justifies the pursuit of self-interest, proliferates the view that Africa is a mere extension of Europe. France might think that its neo-colonial elite will forever remain faithful, but it will soon realize that competing interests from Brazil, China, and South Africa might be more attractive. Omar Bongo, former president of Gabon was quoted in an interview with the magazine Liberation “Gabon without France is like a car with no driver. France without Gabon is like a car with no fuel…” . Sekou Toure had reason to reject Françafrique in Guinea as early as 1958. 56 years later the West African population is demanding for the right to determine their driver, their direction, and their vision, but France still needs fuel, investments and returns. It is a monster, Françafrique.